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A simple fact of life is that all people—taxpayers and evaders alike—
despise taxes and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). General 
perceptions view the IRS as having “inherent advantages over taxpayers,”1 
taking hard-earned money from and effectively irritating Americans each 
April. Because the main objective of the IRS is to raise money for the 
government, taxpayers perceive that the agency acts in a manner that calls 
reasonableness into question.2 Although factually the IRS typically does 
not engage in excessively unreasonable practices,3 taxpayers nonetheless 
may feel victimized by the IRS’s rules. Organizations that associated 
themselves with the Tea Party certainly felt victimized in 2013 when news 
broke that IRS employees had been subjecting groups associated with 
conservative political views to more rigorous standards than non-
conservative organizations.4 What makes taxpayers feel even more 
wronged—often raising attitudes toward the IRS from mere distaste to 
raging hatred—is when one taxpayer is treated in an unequal, and 
presumably unfavorable, manner than his next-door neighbor.5 
A general duty of consistency is imposed on the IRS,6 but when courts 
from state to state—and even courts within states—fail to adhere to the 
same principles for similarly situated taxpayers, people get even angrier. 
Such is the case with IRS revenue rulings, which are published by the IRS 
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 1. Irving Salem et al., ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on 
Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 723 (2004). 
 2. Id. at 725. 
 3. See TREAS. INSP. GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2015-2016 SEMIANN. REP. passim, 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/semiannual/semiannual_mar2016.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/5P47-67D8]. 
 4. See TREAS. INSP. GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2013-10-053, INAPPROPRIATE 
CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW 
(2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf 
(last updated May 14, 2013) [https://perma.cc/E9ZT-RTG9]; IRS Finally Reveals 
List of Tea Party Groups Targeted for Extra Scrutiny, WASH. TIMES (June 5, 
2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/5/irs-reveals-list-of-tea-
party-groups-targeted-for-/ [https://perma.cc/5ZR7-PM7S]. 
 5. See generally Richard J. Wood, Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Tax 
Fairness, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 421 (2006).  
 6. The IRS Mission is to provide United States’ taxpayers top quality service 
by helping them understand and meet their tax responsibilities and enforce the law 
with integrity and fairness to all taxpayers. IRM 1.1.1.2 (June 2, 2015); see also 
I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3) (2012); United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 




and are said to carry the effect of law, though they often are disregarded 
or applied inconsistently by courts.7 Perhaps if the IRS provided its 
employees and United States’ taxpayers with more robust guidance in the 
form of practical revenue rulings, there would not have been an 
opportunity for the Tea Party targeting that occurred within the IRS 
Exempt Organization Division.8 
The Supreme Court of the United States has not issued a definitive 
opinion on the deference that reviewing courts should accord revenue 
rulings, but the Court has offered guidance as to how courts should interpret 
and defer to administrative rulings generally.9 A circuit split exists regarding 
the appropriate treatment of revenue rulings.10 Because revenue rulings are 
not subject to the same level of scrutiny that Treasury regulations receive11 
and because the IRS explicitly provides that revenue rulings do not carry 
the same force that regulations are accorded,12 many scholars argue that 
revenue rulings should be afforded some lesser standard of deference.13 
                                                                                                             
 7. See, e.g., Tedokon v. Comm’r., 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 657, at 4–5 (2002) 
(finding revenue ruling “commanded deference”); Trinova Corp. and Subsidiaries 
v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 68 (1997) (disagreeing with the Second and Ninth Circuits’ 
level of deference to revenue rulings), rev’d sub nom. Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 347 F.3d 173, 180 (6th Cir. 2003) (reversing the Tax Court’s decision 
and acknowledging a change in direction and that in light of recent Supreme Court 
cases, revenue rulings should receive some degree of deference). 
 8. See Nicholas Confessore et al., Confusion and Staff Troubles Rife at I.R.S. 
Office in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19  
/us/politics/at-irs-unprepared-office-seemed-unclear-about-the-rules.html?_r=0  
[https://perma.cc/8VX4-C9MN]. The IRS Exempt Organization department 
administers tax law governing charities, private foundations, and other entities 
exempt from federal income tax. See About Us, IRS, https://www.irs.gov 
/charities-non-profits/about-irs-exempt-organizations (last visited Nov. 16, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/T2M6-C2TV].  
 9. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1940); Chevron U.S.A. 
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218 (2001). 
 10. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 11. See discussion infra Part I. 
 12. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) (as amended in 1989) (“Revenue 
Rulings published in the Bulletin do not have the force and effect of Treasury 
Department Regulations . . . .”). 
 13. See, e.g., Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS 
Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 841, 857–69 (1992); Peter A. Lowy & Juan F. 
Vasquez, Jr., How Revenue Rulings Are Made, and the Implications of That 
Process For Judicial Deference, 101 J. TAX’N 230, 234 (2004) (stating that it is 
abundantly clear that revenue rulings are not entitled to Chevron deference); 




Nonetheless, the regulations also provide that revenue rulings are 
“published to provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, 
and may be cited and relied upon for that purpose.”14 Controversy exists as 
to whether the explicit disclaimer—codified in the Federal Treasury 
regulations15—that revenue rulings do not rise to the level of Treasury 
regulations necessarily strips revenue rulings of the force and effect of law.16 
Nevertheless, applying any standard less than substantial deference to 
revenue rulings conflicts with principles of administrative law and 
contradicts established jurisprudence.17 Applying a lesser standard, such as 
considering revenue rulings merely persuasive, effectively allows courts to 
inject their own analyses into the meaning of the statute at issue, only 
looking to agency interpretations to determine if the interpretations may 
persuade a court otherwise.18 
Part I of this Comment examines the legal principles behind revenue 
rulings, discussing the two main standards of deference that may be 
afforded to administrative rulings generally and assessing how various 
courts have treated revenue rulings. Part II discusses applicability of the 
standards of deference to IRS revenue rulings in light of the Supreme 
Court decision in United States v. Mead Corp19 and the problems that have 
arisen post-Mead. Particularly, this Part explores the standards behind 
agency promulgations that have the force and effect of law. Part III 
assesses revenue rulings and discusses the various reasons why the rulings 
are entitled to substantial judicial deference. Part IV offers a solution to 
alleviate the uncertainty of the deference afforded to revenue rulings, 
focusing on revenue rulings in the context of charitable organizations. Part 
V advocates a call for deference to revenue rulings as supported by the 
examination in Part IV. This Comment concludes by arguing that revenue 
                                                                                                             
Salem et al., supra note 1, at 744 (recommending that federal courts should give 
revenue rulings Skidmore deference). 
 14. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Compare Salem et al., supra note 1, at 744 (providing that revenue rulings 
are not entitled to Chevron deference because they do not have the same force of 
law as Regulations), with Ryan C. Morris, Substantially Deferring to Revenue 
Rulings After Mead, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 999, 1040 (2005) (“A wide variety of 
reasons suggest that revenue rulings are the type of administrative pronouncement 
that deserves Chevron deference . . . .”). 
 17. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 18. See Russell L. Weaver, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Christensen, 
Mead, and Dual Deference Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 174 (2002); see 
also Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 
ADMIN L. REV. 771, 772 (2002). 
 19. Mead Corp. v. United States, 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  




rulings are entitled to Chevron deference as it is both plausible and logical 
given the level of certainty taxpayers desire, the expertise of the IRS, the 
method by which revenue rulings are generated, the penalties associated 
with noncompliance, and the social policies particular to charitable 
organizations.  
I. REVENUE RULINGS AND STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
IRS revenue rulings are official interpretations of substantive tax law20 
and are the “second most important” pronouncements made by the IRS.21 
Defined as official interpretations by the IRS, revenue rulings are 
published to inform and provide guidance to taxpayers, IRS officials, and 
other parties concerned with principles of taxation.22 The issuance of 
revenue rulings may offer interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code 
(“IRC” or “Code”), Treasury regulations, and caselaw as applied to 
hypothetical fact patterns.23 Formally, these promulgations represent the 
IRS’s position on how the law applies to a particular set of facts.24 They 
are formatted in a way that discusses hypothetical facts, applies the 
appropriate law to the proposed facts, and sets forth the proper outcome 
and reasons in support of such outcome.25 
The IRS issues revenue rulings to promote correct and uniform 
application of tax laws by its IRS employees and to assist taxpayers in 
attaining maximum voluntary compliance.26 To those ends, the revenue 
rulings inform IRS personnel of the internal revenue laws, related statutes, 
treaties, regulations, and statements of procedures affecting the rights and 
duties of taxpayers.27 The IRS instructs taxpayers to rely on revenue 
rulings as guidance in applying the particular tax law to substantially 
similar facts.28 In the event that taxpayers choose to ignore the principles 
established in revenue rulings, they may face penalties associated with 
                                                                                                             
 20. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a), (v)(a); see also Rev. Proc. 89-14, § 
3.01, 1989-1 C.B. 814. 
 21. Stichting Pensioenfonds Voor de Gezondheid v. United States, 129 F.3d 
195, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 22. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(6) (1967). 
 23. See IRM 32.2.3.1 (Sept. 16, 2016) (discussing revenue rulings). 
 24. Rev. Proc. 2002-1, 2002-1 C.B. 1. 
 25. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 
1998). 
 26. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1989). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(e). 




noncompliance for “[n]egligence or disregard of rules or regulations.”29 
As revenue rulings are effectively binding to the applications of similar 
facts, they represent more than just pure guidance documents or policy 
statements by the IRS; as statements of the IRS’s position on the law as 
applied to similar facts, revenue rulings also provide standards governing 
IRS taxation treatment unless and until the standard is altered by a 
subsequent IRS promulgation.30 
Revenue rulings and Treasury regulations are the principal means by 
which taxpayers receive guidance in interpreting the IRC;31 nonetheless, 
these means are far from comprehensive and still result in uncertainty 
regarding IRC provisions.32 Revenue rulings differ, however, from 
Treasury regulations, which are authorized by IRC § 7805, and many other 
provisions of the IRC. Regulations are the most formal and authoritative 
interpretations of the IRC.33 Regulations are issued by the Treasury 
Department after extensive review within both the department and the 
IRS34 and are among the highest authorities in administrative 
pronouncements.35 The United States Supreme Court consistently has held 
that courts must defer to regulations in general36 if the regulations are 
“reasonable.”37 Regulations generally are afforded a force of law status.38 
Conversely, revenue rulings do not have the force and effect of 
regulations39 but “are published to provide precedents to be used in the 
                                                                                                             
 29. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2 (as amended in 2003). 
 30. Ehren K. Wade, Just What the Doctor Ordered?: Health Care Reform, 
the IRS, and Negotiated Rulemaking, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 199, 206 (2014). 
 31. Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, 
and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 323, 
324 (2008). 
 32. See discussion infra Part V.B.–C. 
 33. Korb, supra note 31, at 326. 
 34. See GAIL LEVIN RICHMOND, FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH: GUIDE TO 
MATERIALS AND TECHNIQUES 128–29 (7th ed. 2007). 
 35. See, e.g., United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967).  
 36. Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 447–50 (2003); United States 
v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001); Cottage Sav. Ass’n 
v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 560–61 (1991). 
 37. David A. Brennen, Treasury Regulations and Judicial Deference in the 
Post-Chevron Era, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 429 (1997) (stating that typically, 
courts look at “long-standing interpretations that appear acceptable to Congress 
and reliance on historical court precedents [as] legitimate means of establishing 
the reasonableness of an interpretation”). 
 38. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 
44, 51 (2011). 
 39. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) (as amended in 1989). 




disposition of other cases, and may be cited and relied upon for that 
purpose.”40 Although the Supreme Court has provided explicitly that 
Treasury regulations promulgated under notice-and-comment rulemaking41 
carry the force and effect of law sufficient to meet what is required for the 
highest level of deference,42 the Court has not denied such status to revenue 
rulings. 
A. Chevron: The Starting Point in Any Deference Discussion 
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. is where 
any inquiry into the level of judicial deference accorded to administrative 
promulgations in the modern era should begin.43 The issue before the 
Supreme Court in Chevron concerned the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (“EPA”) interpretation of the definition of “stationary source” 
under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.44 Overturning the appellate 
court’s decision and upholding the EPA’s interpretation, the Supreme 
Court created a two-part test that became the standard for judicial review 
of agency decision-making.45 This decision was based on the idea that 
“[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally 
created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the 
making of rules to fill any gap left . . . by Congress”46 and creates a general 
                                                                                                             
 40. Id. 
 41. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that an agency must publish 
notice of its proposed rulemaking and afford interested persons the opportunity to 
submit comments to make binding rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(d) (2012). 
 42. See Mayo, 562 U.S. at 51. 
 43. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 44. Id. at 840. 
 45. Id. at 842–43. The Court provided that review of an agency’s promulgations 
begins with the following analysis:  
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court 
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at 
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.  
Id.  
 46. Id. at 843. 




stance of deference toward an administrative agency’s interpretation of the 
statute entrusted to that particular agency—the agency’s enabling statute.47 
Under a Chevron analysis, courts are instructed to undertake a two-
step process: first, it must determine whether the agency’s own enabling 
statute at issue is clear or ambiguous.48 If the statute is clear, the analysis 
stops because no interpretation, and thus no deference, is necessary.49 If, 
however, the statute is ambiguous, a court must defer to any reasonable 
interpretations of the statute promulgated by the agency.50 If the 
requirements for Chevron deference are not met, an agency promulgation is 
not necessarily stripped of all deference because another standard of 
deference exists.51 
B. Skidmore: Skidding Away from Any Real Deference 
Like Chevron, Skidmore v. Swift & Co. set forth a standard of 
deference for administrative promulgations and required the Court to 
consider the validity of an agency’s interpretation.52 Specifically, the 
Court was tasked with defining “working time” for purposes of overtime 
pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.53 Though Congress was silent, 
the Court determined that the Department of Labor had the authority to 
investigate practices regarding overtime pay, and, as such, the Department 
could seek injunctions to restrain violations of the Act.54 Pursuant to this 
grant of authority, the Department’s Wage and Hour Division issued an 
interpretive bulletin that addressed “working time.”55 The Department of 
Labor also filed an amicus curiae brief, outlining how it would apply the 
standards for “working time” to the facts at bar.56 In line with historical 
practice and policy, the Court found that the views of the Labor Division 
were neither conclusive nor binding on courts.57 Instead, the bulletin was 
found to be a result of the Division’s “official duty, based upon more 
specialized experience and broader investigations and information than is 
                                                                                                             
 47. Morris, supra note 16, at 1040. 
 48. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 49. Id. at 843. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1940). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 135–36. 
 54. See id. at 137. 
 55. Id. at 138. 
 56. See id. at 139. 
 57. Id. 




likely to come to a judge in a particular case.”58 In terms of a Chevron 
approach, the Skidmore Court essentially said that the document setting 
forth the agency’s position being reviewed did not constitute an agency 
policy choice and thus was not within the scope of Chevron.59 Rather, the 
document was an agency interpretation of the policy choices made by 
Congress in the statute.60 As such, courts were not required to defer to this 
bulletin but could use it as guidance and accord any particular weight 
deemed appropriate.61 
Skidmore provided the following factors for courts to consider in 
assessing the appropriate level of judicial deference toward agency views: 
“the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, 
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”62 The 
Skidmore standard is appropriate for more informal agency interpretations 
and is a contingency standard for when Chevron fails.63 Because Congress 
gave the courts express interpretive responsibility regarding the Fair Labor 
Standards Act via statute, as opposed to the agency administrator, the 
Skidmore Court created a standard by which certain agency rulings are 
considered merely persuasive.64 This standard is much less deferential than 
Chevron.65 
C. Comparing Chevron and Skidmore 
The rationale that underlies according agency pronouncements Skidmore 
deference stems from the idea that agencies have specialized experience 
compared to the courts as well as a greater opportunity to investigate and 
obtain relevant information.66 This level of deference vests the reviewing 
court with final arbitrating power on whether the agency’s interpretation 
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. 
 59. John F. Cloverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of 
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 
54–55 (2003).  
 60. Id. 
 61. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Bradley Lipton, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 
119 YALE L. J. 2096, 2123 (2010). 
 64. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 65. See generally Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
 66. Morris, supra note 16, at 1025. 




is persuasive,67 leaving a wide opportunity for courts to disregard agency 
interpretations completely if they so choose.68 
Chevron rests on the presumption that Congress wanted agencies, 
rather than courts, to act as the primary interpreters of their respective 
statutory schemes.69 As such, under Chevron, agency interpretations are 
entitled to deference as a matter of right.70 Courts are bound by mandatory 
deference to the agency interpretation so long as the requisite two prongs 
are met.71 Conversely, Skidmore involves a balancing of interests and vests 
the judiciary with much more discretion regarding deferential treatment of 
agency interpretations.72 If the reviewing court is satisfied that an agency 
has demonstrated expertise and did not act in an unreasonable manner, 
Skidmore allows—but does not require—courts to defer to the agency 
interpretation.73 
The test provided by Chevron and the presumption in favor of agency 
interpretations as authoritative serve as an analytic barrier against active 
judicial review of agency decisions unless such decisions are 
unreasonable.74 Contrarily, under Skidmore, courts are free to adopt 
whatever interpretation of statutes they so choose.75 Skidmore “makes clear 
that the weight given to the agency interpretation is always ultimately up to 
the court.”76 Whereas Chevron makes the interpretation binding on courts, 
Skidmore effectively makes the agency “earn” judicial acknowledgement of 
its position.77 
                                                                                                             
 67. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: 
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism In Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 
1552 (2006). 
 68. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269 (2006) (discussing how 
under Skidmore, the Court was following an agency’s rule only to the extent that 
it is persuasive, and that in this particular case, the Attorney General’s opinion 
was not persuasive and thus received no deference); Hall v. EPA, 273 F.3d 1146, 
1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act). 
 69. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001). 
 70. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 
833, 856 (2001). 
 71. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
 72. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 70, at 858–59. 
 73. See Hickman, supra note 67, at 1553. 
 74. Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An Empirical 
Study of the Supreme Court’s Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States 
v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 301 (2002). 
 75. Salem et al., supra note 1, at 755. 
 76. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 70, at 856. 
 77. Id. 




D. Historical Deference to Revenue Rulings 
Although Skidmore and Chevron provide the two basic deferential 
standards applied to administrative promulgations of law, the historical 
deference accorded to revenue rulings by various courts has left the 
deference status of revenue rulings muddled and uncertain.78 In particular 
circumstances, revenue rulings are entitled to judicial deference, such as 
when the revenue ruling reflects the contemporaneous and established 
interpretation of a statutory provision79 or when the revenue ruling 
represents the interpretation by the IRS of its own regulation.80 In other 
cases, the decisions are in conflict.81 
The United States Tax Court has held that it is not bound by revenue 
rulings,82 viewing revenue rulings instead as mere opinions of the IRS—
with no effect of law—and claiming that revenue rulings are not binding 
on the Commissioner or on the courts.83 But the Tax Court also has 
admitted that taxpayers should be able to rely on revenue rulings.84 
The majority of United States appellate courts hold the opinion that, 
though revenue rulings are not tantamount to Treasury regulations, they 
nevertheless are entitled to some level of deference, including “respectful 
                                                                                                             
 78. See, e.g., Amato v. W. Union Int’l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1411 (2d Cir. 
1985) (citing numerous cases for the proposition that revenue rulings were entitled 
to great deference and carried “the force of legal precedents”); Carle Found. v. 
United States, 611 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1979) (giving rulings weight). But 
see Knowlton v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 160, 165 (1985) (“While [revenue] rulings are 
not binding upon us, . . . we are entitled to utilize such rulings as an aid to 
interpretation.”), aff’d, 791 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 79. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 484 (1990); Jewett v. 
Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305, 318 (1982); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United 
States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933). 
 80. See, e.g., Cottage Sav. Ass’n. v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 563 (1990); 
Jewett, 455 U.S. at 318; Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n. v. United States, 440 U.S. 
472, 484 (1979). 
 81. See, e.g., Progressive Corp. v. United States, 970 F.2d 188, 194 (6th Cir. 
1992) (stating that revenue rulings “are entitled to great deference, and have been 
said to ‘have the force of legal precedents’”). But see Stubbs, Overbeck & 
Associates, Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146–47 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting 
that a revenue ruling is “merely the opinion of a lawyer in the agency” and “is not 
binding on the Secretary or the courts”). 
 82. Baker v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 143, 164 n.21 (2004), and cases cited therein. 
 83. See, e.g., Estate of McLendon v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 42, 45 (1996). 
 84. Baker, 122 T.C. at 164 n.21, and cases cited therein. 




consideration [and] some weight,”85 “great deference,”86 the “force of 
legal precedent,”87 and “considerable weight.”88 Other circuits explicitly 
left open the question of which standard of deference applies to revenue 
rulings.89 Conversely, the Sixth Circuit once extended Chevron deference 
to a revenue ruling,90 although it more recently has concluded that revenue 
rulings may not necessarily be entitled to Chevron deference but should 
carry “at least some added persuasive force.”91 The Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits have held that a longstanding revenue ruling is entitled to 
substantial deference as long as the interpretation of the statute is 
reasonable,92 which is language mirroring the deference standard set forth 
in Chevron.93  
The United States Supreme Court also has spoken on the issue. The 
Court initially applied Chevron to revenue rulings and noted that 
interpretive rulings do not carry the same force and effect as Treasury 
regulations.94 In Davis v. United States, the Court nonetheless held that 
agency interpretations and practices must be given considerable weight 
when they involve the contemporaneous construction of a statute and 
reflect longstanding practices.95 Later cases—in which the Court noted 
that the rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations—indicate a 
shift in policy.96 In Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. v. United States, the 
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Court concluded that, although the revenue ruling was not entitled to 
Chevron deference, “the Rulings simply reflect the agency’s longstanding 
interpretation of its own regulations. Because that interpretation is 
reasonable, it attracts substantial judicial deference.”97 More recent cases, 
however, have avoided addressing the level of deference that should be 
given but seem to leave open an opportunity for revenue rulings to be 
entitled to Chevron deference by modifying the Chevron standard as 
applied to all agency promulgations and setting forth alternative ways for 
a promulgation to come within Chevron’s domain.98 
II. CHRISTENSEN, MEAD, AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS 
Following Skidmore and Chevron, courts across the nation were 
divided on the issue of whether, and to what extent, the judiciary should 
defer to agency interpretations of law; views ranged from affording 
substantial deference to giving no deference whatsoever.99 In the wake of 
such confusion, the Supreme Court attempted to determine the proper 
deferential standard treatment. 
A. Christensen v. Harris County 
Amid the circuit splits and lack of clarity regarding the scope of 
Chevron application, Christensen v. Harris County100 was the Supreme 
Court’s first attempt to recognize the issue of Chevron’s scope and offer 
clarity.101 At issue was an advisory letter written by the United States 
Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (“Wage and Hour 
Division”) in response to an inquiry by Harris County regarding a proposed 
policy on compensatory time.102 The Court reasoned that Chevron 
deference was not appropriate for the advisory opinion letter signed by an 
acting administrator of the Wage and Hour Division because it was “an 
interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for 
example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.”103 The 
Court held that “[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters—like 
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interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines”—inherently lacked the force of law and thus did 
not warrant Chevron deference.104 Rather, interpretations that are designed 
like opinion letters “are ‘entitled to respect’ under [the Court’s] decision 
in [Skidmore], but only to the extent that those interpretations have the 
‘power to persuade.’”105 
The Court based its reasoning on the production process that generated 
the letter and its lack of procedural protections.106 Christensen clarified 
that not all agency interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference but 
offered no guidance on how to determine which interpretations qualify.107 
Thus, although Christensen noted the absence of particular factors—such 
as formal adjudication, notice-and-comment procedures, and the force of 
law108—will result in Skidmore deference rather than Chevron deference, 
the Court failed to produce guidelines for determining which 
promulgations are to be considered the force of law. 
B. United States v. Mead Corp. 
One year after Christensen, the Supreme Court again tackled the scope 
of Chevron deference in United States v. Mead Corp.109 At issue was a 
ruling letter by the United States Customs Service that changed the 
classification of the Mead Corporation’s day planners under the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.110 The Tariff Act of 
1930 and Treasury regulations direct the Customs Service to classify 
merchandise and fix the rate and amount of duty applicable.111 Customs 
Service completes this task by issuing ruling letters.112 In Mead, the 
corporation challenged a Customs Service letter ruling that reclassified 
day planners, thereby subjecting the corporation to a new tariff.113 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari “to consider the limits of Chevron 
deference owed to administrative practice in applying a statute” and held 
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that the ruling letter was not entitled to Chevron deference.114 The Court 
reasoned that 
[t]here are, nonetheless, ample reasons to deny Chevron deference 
here. The authorization for classification rulings, and Customs’s 
practice in making them, present a case far removed not only from 
notice-and-comment process, but from any other circumstances 
reasonably suggesting that Congress ever thought of classification 
rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them here.115 
Under the agency’s own regulations, this type of ruling letter was limited 
because it applied only to a small category of goods and was determined 
on a case-by-case basis.116 The ruling letters were issued quickly and 
without notice-and-comment, and any agency office could issue this type 
of ruling without detailed reasoning for its decision.117 These ruling letters 
rarely set out the rationale behind the classification decision in detail.118 
In denying Chevron deference to this letter ruling, the Court decided 
that although Congress had given the Customs Service authority to act 
with the force of law, no congressional intent existed for according the 
ruling letters such force.119 The ruling letter could not have the force of 
law because the letter did not bind third parties and contained a warning 
against assuming any right of detrimental reliance.120 The Court did not 
elaborate on what was meant by the “force of law.”121 The Court 
determined that the ruling letter was more akin to a policy statement, 
agency manual, or enforcement guideline that was outside the scope of 
Chevron deference.122 In reversing, the Court remanded the case back to 
the lower court to be considered in light of the Skidmore standard.123 
Per Mead, two conditions must be met to conclude that congressional 
intent warrants a grant of Chevron deference. Mead instructs courts to 
apply Chevron only when Congress has given the particular agency the 
authority to bind parties with “the force of law” and when the agency 
actually acted “in the exercise of that authority.”124 If one or both of these 
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requisite conditions are not met, then Skidmore is the appropriate level of 
deference to be applied.125 The Mead opinion made clear that Skidmore is 
the proper alternative when Chevron deference is not applicable. 
Mead requires courts to look first at statutory circumstances to 
determine whether congressional intent “to delegate general authority to 
make rules with the force of law” exists.126 This congressional intent may 
be evident through an express delegation of authority,127 an agency’s 
general authority, and other statutory circumstances that evidence an 
expectation of the agency to act with force of law when addressing 
ambiguity in the statute or filling gaps in enacted law.128 Courts further are 
instructed to assess whether Congress expressly authorized the agency to 
engage in rulemaking or adjudication processes as a means for producing 
the rulings or regulations for which deference is claimed.129 Explicit 
congressional authorization for these processes is helpful in determining 
if Congress has accorded an agency the ability to act with the force and 
effect of law.130 Moreover, Mead noted that agencies engaging in notice-
and-comment rulemaking fall under the umbrella of congressionally 
intended force and effect of law status.131 
If the requisites for Chevron deference are not met, Mead obliges 
courts to consider the particular agency promulgation in light of 
Skidmore.132 Courts are instructed to weigh “the thoroughness evident in 
[the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”133 The majority opinion 
in Mead suggests a sliding scale of deference. Failure to meet Chevron 
vests the reviewing court with the power to determine what, if any, 
deference should be given to the agency action at bar.134 Although 
Skidmore provides factors that courts must consider, ultimately a court 
reviewing an agency promulgation under Skidmore effectively considers 
the promulgation as just another piece of paper for review on the judge’s 
desk.135 Although a Skidmore result is troublesome, the same concern does 
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not arise for revenue rulings because the rulings meet the Mead 
requirements for Chevron applicability and should be owed substantial 
deference. 
III. SUBSTANTIALLY DEFERRING TO REVENUE RULINGS: MEETING MEAD 
When Mead was before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
the court noted in its comparison of the Customs promulgations and IRS 
publications that “[c]ustoms’ classifications rulings are in some ways an 
even less formalized body of interpretations than IRS revenue rulings.”136 
In Mead, the ruling letter, notably less formal than revenue rulings, was 
accorded Skidmore deference.137 It follows that more formal revenue 
rulings are entitled to a greater level of deference: Chevron deference. The 
open-ended language of Mead leaves open the possibility of granting 
Chevron deference to revenue rulings because the Court abandoned the 
presumption that allowed courts to accept all reasonable agency action in 
filling gaps or clarifying ambiguities in favor of agency interpretations that 
have the force and effect of law.138 The legal qualities of revenue rulings 
meeting the two prongs of Mead in addition to sound policy both support 
such a finding of substantial deference. 
A. Force and Effect of Law: The Congressional Grant 
An act or promulgation with the force and effect of law binds those 
who act, those acted upon, and the courts that review the agency’s 
interpretation.139 As demonstrated in Mead, an agency whose action is 
under review must be congressionally vested with authority to bind 
regulated parties with the “force of law” to receive Chevron deference.140 
This requisite legal force may be evidenced by notice-and-comment 
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rulemaking or by formal adjudication.141 Although such evidence is 
sufficient, neither notice-and-comment nor formal adjudication is 
necessary for a finding of Chevron applicability; as such, revenue rulings 
are not thrust immediately from the realm of Chevron deference for 
lacking those procedural components.142 
Mead clarified that the absence of notice-and-comment is not fatal to 
a finding of Chevron deference.143 This idea was reiterated in Barnhart v. 
Walton when the Supreme Court, in a discussion of Mead, noted that just 
because an agency reached its interpretation through a method less formal 
than notice-and-comment rulemaking, the interpretation should not be 
deprived automatically of the judicial deference otherwise due.144 The 
Court noted that Mead spoke to instances in which the Court has applied 
Chevron deference to agency interpretations that did not arise from notice-
and-comment rulemaking and that the level of deference accorded depends 
largely on the interpretive method used for promulgating the action and 
the nature of the question at issue.145 
Although revenue rulings are not generated through formal notice-
and-comment procedures, the issuance of revenue rulings is remarkably 
centralized nonetheless and encompasses numerous levels of review 
within the IRS.146 Contrary to the United States Customs Service ruling 
letter at issue in Mead, only the IRS National Office issues revenue 
rulings.147 The Associate Chief Counsel and Assistant Commissioner “are 
responsible for the preparation and appropriate referral for publication of 
revenue rulings reflecting interpretations of substantive tax law.”148 
Ultimately, the “same level of the IRS and the Treasury Department” that 
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reviews Treasury regulations also writes and reviews revenue rulings.149 
Because Congress, the Treasury, and all taxpayers adhere to the 
understanding that Treasury regulations are legally binding on both the 
government and taxpayers,150 it follows that revenue rulings, issued with 
relatively the same purpose and in a similar manner, should be afforded 
such status. 
Although revenue rulings are legally binding, another concern that 
arises in the context of a force and effect of law analysis is whether a 
promulgation is legislative or interpretive in nature. In the past, scholars 
and courts alike have scrutinized IRS promulgations, with a focus on 
Treasury regulations, and debated whether such promulgations are 
legislative or interpretive.151 This distinction was crucial in the past 
because only legislative promulgations were considered for Chevron 
deference.152 The division between legislative and interpretive rules and 
regulations arose in Chevron in which the Court noted that the Chevron 
doctrine represented the Court’s view of deference to legislative 
regulations, implying that non-legislative, or interpretive, regulations were 
entitled to the lesser Skidmore deference.153 
Generally, legislative rules and regulations are promulgated pursuant 
to a specific statutory congressional grant of authority;154 interpretive 
rules, in contrast, are generated under a more general congressional grant 
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of authority,155 such as the authority to promulgate “all needful rules and 
regulations” related to the internal revenue function.156 This distinction, 
however, is no longer significant because the Supreme Court has dispelled 
with it.157 Mead noted that Congress “may not have expressly delegated 
authority or responsibility to implement a particular [statutory] provision 
or fill a particular gap.”158 It still can be apparent from the agency’s 
generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that 
Congress intended for the agency to speak with the force of law when 
addressing ambiguities or filling gaps, even a statutory space or ambiguity 
that Congress did not intend.159 In terms of force of law status, Mead failed 
to mention the distinction between legislative and interpretive agency 
acts.160 In the most recent Supreme Court case employing a Chevron 
review in the tax realm, the Court did not analyze whether the statute was 
legislative versus interpretive and only asked if the statute was ambiguous 
such that the regulation came within the realm of Chevron.161 Thus, even 
though many scholars argue revenue rulings are inherently interpretive162 
as opposed to legislative, the argument that only legislative rules are 
within the scope of Chevron deference fails in light of Mead and Mayo.163 
The contested interpretive versus legislative nature of revenue rulings164 
does not detract from their status as having the force and effect of law. 
Congressional intent that the IRS revenue rulings carry force of law 
also is evidenced by the words of the IRC. Revenue rulings are 
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promulgated under an express congressional grant of general authority.165 
Congress has empowered the Secretary of the Treasury and the IRS with 
the broad authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations” to 
enforce the IRC, including all rules and regulations deemed necessary to 
carry out the various functions of the IRS.166 Although this grant of 
authority most often is cited for the legal effect of Treasury regulations, 
revenue rulings also are promulgated pursuant to this general grant of 
authority.167 Because Treasury regulations are explicitly within the realm 
of Chevron deference,168 and revenue rulings are similar in weight, 
generation, and penalty provisions—thus created with the force of law 
status—revenue rulings accompany Treasury regulations within Chevron’s 
domain. 
B. Force and Effect of Law: Owning Your Power 
The second inquiry under Mead instructs the reviewing court to look 
at the specific agency action in question to determine if the agency is 
acting with the force of law.169 IRC § 6662 imposes penalties on taxpayers 
who underreport and underpay their taxes because of “negligence or 
disregard of rules or regulations.”170 The rules and regulations associated 
with penalties include revenue rulings or notices issued by the IRS.171 
Revenue rulings have the support of a congressional penalty, which 
indicates that Congress intended them to carry the force and effect of 
law.172 As a purely legal matter, taxpayers are subject to penalties for 
failing to comply with guidance published by the IRS, including revenue 
rulings; association with penal provisions sufficiently supports the 
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proposition that revenue rulings carry the force and effect of law.173 Basic 
logic surely associates penalties for non-compliance to derive only from 
legally mandated rules. The authority of the IRS to subject a taxpayer to 
penalties for noncompliance cannot be supported by any idea other than 
that authority, and the rules and regulations enacted pursuant to it carry the 
force and effect of law. In comparison, the EPA has authority to establish 
thresholds for drinking water contaminants.174 Violations of these rules 
may lead to penalties of up to $25,000 per day.175 Courts have applied 
Chevron deference to these rules.176 According to Mayo, there is no 
exceptionalism to be accorded to tax law; instead, consistency is required 
between tax law and other areas of the law.177 Penalties leading to Chevron 
deference in one area of administrative law necessarily means penalties 
should be equated with Chevron deference in the tax arena. 
Some scholars argue that penal provisions do not weigh in favor of 
promulgations having the force of law.178 For example, if a taxpayer 
refuses or fails to follow guidance published by the IRS, including revenue 
rulings, the taxpayer is not subject to the penalty if the taxpayer’s position 
“has a realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits,” regardless of 
whether noncompliance is disclosed or the taxpayer intends to challenge 
the validity of the respective IRS guidance;179 the lack of blanket penal 
enforcement suggests that a taxpayer need not disclose on his tax return 
that he chose to deviate from a revenue ruling. The disclosure requirement 
for noncompliance with revenue rulings is notably different from the 
requirements for Treasury regulations, in which positions adopted by 
taxpayers that are inconsistent with regulations must be disclosed on tax 
returns and the taxpayer must have a “reasonable basis” to avoid the 
penalty.180 Noncompliance with a regulation also must represent “a good 
faith challenge to the validity of the regulation.”181 Notwithstanding the 
difference in penalties for disclosure of and nonconformity with regulations 
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versus revenue rulings, penalties for noncompliance with revenue rulings 
still emerge from a statutory grant of authority. Considering these 
mandatory and disciplinary provisions as separate and distinct from the 
principles that carry the force and effect of law not only defies the law but 
also defies basic logic. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF REVENUE RULINGS AND THE APPROPRIATE 
DEFERENCE STANDARD: EXAMINING CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS  
For regulations and revenue rulings alike, the IRS, through various 
review mechanisms, acts with goals of consistency and coordination in 
mind.182 Because of the countless duties of the IRS and the volume of 
transactions and interactions between the IRS and taxpayers, “perfection 
in the administration of such vast responsibilities cannot be expected.”183 
Though no perfect solution exists to solve the problem of inconsistency in 
a way that also guarantees a mechanism for absolute taxpayer certainty, 
revenue rulings provide a vehicle for a near-perfect solution. Revenue 
rulings often contain original and core standards by which the IRS 
approaches taxation transactions, but if courts simply regard them as just 
a piece of paper with no legal weight—a position that taxpayers eventually 
will also take—the IRS is robbed of any incentive to issue revenue rulings. 
An examination of how revenue rulings are used in tax, specifically in 
the context of tax-exempt organizations, highlights the need for a 
consistent deferential standard and supports a finding that Chevron 
deference is appropriate. A cursory glance of § 501(c) of the IRC leaves 
much to be desired for guidance on what exactly is required for an 
organization to qualify as a tax-exempt entity.184 Outside guidance on 
qualification for and upkeep of exempt status is absolutely necessary185 
because over 1.5 million charitable organizations exist in the United 
States,186 and the IRC provisions setting forth which entities qualify as tax 
exempt cover a mere one page of the incredibly voluminous Code.187 
Although the IRS has provided some substantive guides that elaborate on 
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the standards of § 501(c) in the regulations,188 the elaborative content 
consists of broad restatements and leaves many unanswered questions.189 
The IRS primarily has addressed these gaps in the Code with formal 
guidance, including revenue rulings.190 The ensuing discussion analyzes a 
sample of revenue rulings issued in the context of tax exempt 
organizations and provides seminal standards by which the law of exempt 
organizations is governed. The discussion concludes by discussing the 
implications of failing to defer substantially to these core legal principles. 
A. Hospitals  
Revenue Ruling 69-545 examined whether two different nonprofit 
hospitals qualified for an exemption from federal income tax under § 
501(c)(3)191 of the IRC.192 The first hospital was exempt because it had an 
emergency room open to everyone—in addition to providing care to all 
people in the community who could pay, having an open medical staff, 
and using surplus funds on expanding facilities, improving quality of care, 
medical training, education, and research.193 Additionally, the hospital was 
operated by a board of trustees composed of neutral community leaders.194 
Conversely, the second hospital was not exempt from federal income tax 
because it was not operated for the exclusive benefit of the public but, 
rather significantly, operated for the private benefit of the previous 
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owners.195 Though the second hospital was owned by a nonprofit 
organization at the time, the previous private owners still retained control 
of the hospital through the board of trustees and committees, using that 
control to limit several functions of the hospital and execute favorable 
rental agreements with the hospital for office space.196 
In deciding whether a particular hospital qualified for an exemption, 
Revenue Ruling 69-545 established the “community benefit standard,” 
which hospitals must meet in order to attain tax-exempt status as a 
charitable organization.197 Prior to this Revenue Ruling, to obtain 
exemption a hospital needed to “be operated to the extent of its financial 
ability for those not able to pay for the services rendered and not 
exclusively for those who are able and expected to pay.”198 
Rather than simply standing for the proposition that a functioning 
emergency room satisfies the requirements of § 501(c)(3), this Ruling 
stands for the idea that “charitable” is defined broadly in terms of 
community benefit and holds that promoting health constitutes a 
“charitable purpose” under § 501(c)(3).199 This widely accepted standard, 
which still exists today as one test required for nonprofit hospitals to 
achieve tax-exempt status, represents the idea that revenue rulings, as a 
whole, signify much more than just substantive law applied to very 
particular facts. Rather, revenue rulings convey sound legal reasoning and 
mandates that, as evident from the longevity of this specific test, have the 
force and effect of law.200 For example, the express language of Revenue 
Ruling 69-545 states that “Revenue Ruling 56-185 is hereby modified to 
remove therefrom the requirements relating to caring for patients without 
charge or at rates below cost.”201 If Revenue Ruling 56-185 applied only 
to the specific factual scenario and substantially similar circumstances, 
modification of that specific standard would have been unnecessary. 
Instead, presumably recognizing the wide breadth of the standards that 
revenue rulings have, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 69-545 by both 
building from and revising the principles of Revenue Ruling 56-185. 
Revenue Ruling 89-157 revised the community benefit standard when 
the IRS determined that operating an emergency room open to the public 
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was not required to meet the community benefit test, so long as other 
substantial factors existed signifying that the hospital operated for the 
public benefit.202 This Ruling also stated that specialty hospitals, which are 
not expected to operate emergency rooms due to the nature of the 
specialized practice, also can qualify for the § 501(c)(3) exemption if 
similar substantial factors showing that the hospital operates exclusively 
for the benefit of the community are present.203 Reading Revenue Ruling 
89-157 in conjunction with Revenue Ruling 69-545, it becomes clear that 
a nonprofit hospital must make its services available to the entire 
community and provide additional community or public benefits to qualify 
for § 501(c)(3) exemption status.204 
Not only is the progress of the IRS standard for exempt hospitals 
shown through the evolution of the discussed revenue rulings, these 
rulings also provide for flexibility and change.205 Read together, these 
revenue rulings indicate that no single factor controls in determining 
exemption status and that all facts and circumstances must be weighed.206 
The IRS repeatedly has chosen to promulgate the particular hospital 
exemption requirements through revenue rulings; that historical pattern of 
decisions should not be discounted by a low standard of judicial 
deference.207 In fact, these rulings, which provide the governing standard 
for exemption status, have withstood numerous attempts by various 
legislators to modify or change the community benefit standard.208 Molding 
standards of charitable purposes into rigid legislative rules is difficult and 
often illogical because unbending standards do not take into account the 
flexibility and factual considerations required.209 Because the rulings 
establishing and elaborating on the community benefit standard are 
reasonable interpretations of IRC § 501(c)(3) standards for maintaining 
                                                                                                             
 202. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.  
 203. Id. 
 204. See IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2003).  
 205. See Bobby A. Courtney, Hospital Tax-Exemption and the Community 
Benefit Standard: Considerations for Future Policymaking, 8 IND. HEALTH L. 
REV. 365, 368–71 (2011).  
 206. Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-
For-Profit Health Care Delivery Structures; A Regeneration of Tax Exemption 
Standards, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1, 49 (1995).  
 207. See Courtney, supra note 205, at 393. 
 208. Proposed, but not passed, legislation has attempted to modify or abandon 
the current community benefit standard. See, e.g., H.R. 790, 102d Cong. (1991) 
(introduced by Representative Edward R. Roybal to move toward relief of poverty 
or charity standard); H.R. 1374, 102d Cong. (1991) (introduced by Representative 
Brian J. Donnelly to move toward relief of poverty or charity standard). 
 209. See Hackney, supra note 185, at 115–16. 




exempt status, courts should be bound to defer to the community benefit 
standard. For example, failure to accord the community benefit standard 
Chevron deference would call into question the exemption status of many 
hospitals and open the door for discrimination across the courts.210 
B. Unrelated Business Income and the Notion of “Relatedness” 
Another area of the law in which tax-exempt organizations rely on the 
promulgation of revenue rulings as a basis for certain criteria is unrelated 
business income.211 Section 511 of the IRC states that taxes are imposed 
on the unrelated business income of tax-exempt organizations.212 The 
purpose of taxing income that is unrelated to the organization’s exempt 
purpose is to equalize exempt organizations and their non-exempt 
competitors.213 Although the Code provides that income subject to taxation 
is income from a trade or business not substantially related to the 
organization’s performance of its charitable purpose or function,214 the 
Code also leaves much to be desired for specific organizations that must 
determine whether certain arms of their businesses trigger income tax or 
are protected by the § 503(c) exemption.215 Because the IRC is not the 
proper forum to evaluate various entities and whether a new arm of 
business is sufficiently related to the exemption-related purpose, the IRS 
uses revenue rulings to promulgate guidance.216 One such promulgation, 
Revenue Ruling 73-104, provided that an art museum’s sale of greeting 
cards that reproduced artwork on display in these museums was exempt 
from income tax as an unrelated trade or business under § 513 because it 
contributed importantly to the accomplishment of the museum’s 
purpose.217 Although the cards were sold at a profit and in competition 
with other greeting card publishers, the sale of the cards still was related 
to the museum’s exempt purpose.218 
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The next revenue ruling issued, Revenue Ruling 73-105, further 
provided that an American folk art museum selling reproductions of art 
and books in the associated gift shop would not be subject to income tax 
from an unrelated trade or business because these items contributed to 
accomplishing the museum’s exempt purpose—existing as an educational 
art museum on the basis of ownership, maintenance, and exhibition for 
public viewing of an art collection.219 The IRS, however, reached a 
different result for scientific books and city-based souvenirs sold in the gift 
shop: these items had no causal relationship with—and did not contribute 
to—the museum’s exempt educational purpose, so the sale constituted 
taxable unrelated trade or business income under § 513 of the Code.220 
These rulings underscore the importance of carefully considering the 
extent to which the characteristics of items sold by a charitable organization 
furthers the organization’s exempt purpose to determine if taxable unrelated 
business income has been generated or if the income is exempt under § 
513.221 
C. Political Campaign Activity   
A third area of charitable organization tax law in dire need of clarity 
and deference involves § 501(c)(3) organizations and their involvement in 
political campaign activity.222 In order for a § 501(c)(3) organization to 
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enjoy income tax exemption under § 501(a), the organization may not 
participate or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of or in 
opposition to any candidate for public office.223 Although the plain 
language of § 501(c)(3) purports to bar involvement in political campaign 
activities, this interpretation has been negated by essential caselaw and 
revenue rulings.224 
Complying with each requirement for tax-exempt status is paramount 
for § 501(c)(3) organizations because without such obedience, these 
organizations may face penalties225 and/or lose their § 501(c)(3) 
organization status altogether, thus subjecting themselves to income taxes 
on revenues.226 As such, organizations want and need robust and bright-
line rules on how to avoid prohibited political campaign activities. 
Following the 2004 election year, § 501(c)(3) organizations had many 
questions regarding election year activities and the prohibition on political 
campaign involvement.227 In an effort to help these organizations stay in 
compliance with federal tax law, the IRS issued Fact Sheet 2006-17 to 
enhance education and enforcement efforts while the agency drafted a 
more comprehensive and authoritative source of guidance.228 This “living” 
document—the predecessor to Revenue Ruling 2007-41—was issued with 
a request and encouragement for comments from the public, which would 
then be, and in fact were, taken into consideration for future IRS 
developments and feedback.229 
In the midst of a bare statute and minimal regulations on point, 
Revenue Ruling 2007-41 was issued to provide guidance on the scope of 
the tax law prohibition of political campaign activities by § 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt organizations.230 In an effort to delineate allowable and 
unallowable activities related to political campaign activities, Revenue 
Ruling 2007-41 set forth 21 scenarios with examples and explanations of 
whether the specific activity constituted participation or intervention in a 
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political campaign.231 Revenue Ruling 2007-41, however, also provides 
that the final determination of whether a § 501(c)(3) organization runs 
afoul to the political campaign prohibition “depends on all of the facts and 
circumstances of each case.”232 Furthermore, unlike other areas of tax law, 
the campaign intervention prohibition—and Revenue Ruling 2007-41 
specifically—has been subject to very few judicial decisions.233 As such, 
the meaning of factors addressed in Revenue Ruling 2007-41 is uncertain, 
and exempt organizations are forced to be excessively risk-averse and to 
avoid “even the most benign nonpartisan efforts altogether.”234 
Section 501(c)(3) organizations—the most numerous category of tax-
exempt organizations in the United States235—have pushed repeatedly for 
more guidance on how to comply with the political campaign prohibition.236 
Because of the large number of organizations subject to this prohibition and 
the lack of clarity on it, the IRS should develop guiding rules237 to improve 
compliance and provide for more predictable outcomes.238 Advocates for 
comprehensive rules regarding the full range of potential activities that will 
or will not violate the campaign intervention prohibition realistically 
acknowledge that adopting Treasury regulations is not possible.239 Rather, 
these advocates repeatedly have proposed a solution in the form of revenue 
rulings.240 Furthermore, Revenue Ruling 2007-41 demonstrates that 
creating a set of rules regarding the campaign intervention prohibition is 
not an unattainable task; the IRS can and has given a “manageable set of 
categories in which political campaign intervention is most likely to 
arise.”241 Once these organizations become more informed under 
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promulgated rules, scholars predict that behavior will fall more in line with 
legal norms,242 which unquestionably is a goal of the IRS.243 
Although IRS promulgations regarding the campaign intervention 
prohibition are desperately needed, the IRS is unlikely to devote time and 
resources to producing guidance if it will not be respected as binding 
law.244 Although revenue rulings are undeniably the solution to elaborating 
on Revenue Rule 2007-41 and filling gaps in the prohibition, no reason 
exists for the IRS to produce such if courts fail to defer to the promulgations. 
Granting Chevron deference to these hypothetical revenue rulings—and all 
revenue rulings—promotes the promulgation of “administrative directives 
in a way that best effects compliance.”245 If the judiciary substantially 
defers to the hypothetical revenue rulings, it signals to the public that the 
rulings represent the applicable law and that § 501(c)(3) organizations can 
rely on the rulings without risking losing their exemption status. 
D. Complexity of Charitable Organizations Tax Law as a Whole  
The IRS develops guidance items, including specific revenue rulings, 
“in large part based on its agents’ interactions with charitable organizations 
in adjudications.”246 There obviously is a standard that must be applied in 
determining whether an entity is tax exempt as a charitable organization, 
but the requisite standard is not necessarily one that can be encompassed 
in a rigid, statutory rule.247 The idea and nature of “charity” is a fluid 
concept, changing over time with society and thus should exist in a manner 
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easily modified248—a concept recognized by the Supreme Court.249 In 
1913, when the income tax was created, racial discrimination was 
commonly accepted among society and Congress.250 Noting the flexible 
and changing nature of the charitable standard, the Court in 1983 held that 
such discrimination was contrary to public policy; thus, an otherwise tax-
exempt organization could be denied exempt status because of racially 
discriminatory policies.251 The Court’s decision in Bob Jones University 
v. United States is one of many illustrations of the evolving perception of 
charitable purposes in the eyes of society.252 Because of the evolving 
connotation of “charity,” the applicable rules and regulations for charitable 
organizations must be open to flexibility and progression as society grows. 
As seen above in the context of health care and exemption status, 
unrelated business income, and political campaign activity, the 
considerations that must be weighed in evaluating an organization’s status 
as a § 501(c)(3) entity do not necessarily lend themselves to a rigid rule 
appropriate for statutory codification. The ability of revenue rulings to take 
the general position of the IRS and mold a concept around particular facts 
and circumstances, such as location-based souvenirs versus museum-
content souvenirs, not only conveys the position of the IRS clearly in 
regard to a question of tax law but also illustrates the correct way to apply 
this concept. If revenue rulings are to be disregarded—or considered 
merely persuasive—taxpayer reliance on them may be eroded, and 
eventually, the IRC will become lengthier and more complex, with 
specific provisions like the precise designation of each individual souvenir 
that can be sold in a tax-exempt museum and whether the corresponding 
income would be excluded.253 Because the IRS is vested with the authority 
to produce fact-sensitive opinions affecting many taxpayers in a quicker 
manner and with a broader sweep than courts, these rulings should be 
entitled to substantial judicial deference. 
It became evident from the resulting Tea Party scandal254 that the IRS 
was looking for ways to streamline some of the various processes the IRS 
must engage in with very little guidance.255 Perhaps if IRS agents had 
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informal guidance like revenue rulings to rely on, much of the 
discrimination toward Tea Party organizations could have been avoided as 
there would have been no need for the already overworked exemption 
division256 to craft its own personal methods for evaluating potentially tax-
exempt organizations. Statutory provisions, due to the costs and 
difficulties associated with promulgation, are not necessarily appropriate 
for establishing the standards by which charitable rules are governed.257 
Rather, “[c]haritable tax law should instead promote a range of diverse 
ideas.”258 Having a statutory, rule-oriented regime precludes the 
promotion of ideas before they can even arise.259 The taxation laws 
covering tax-exempt organizations demonstrate that revenue rulings are 
more suitable to address the constant fluctuation that the tax realm 
endures.260 
V. A CALL FOR DEFERENCE  
Though confusion among the circuit courts regarding the proper 
standard of review for IRS guidance documents exists, logic and 
experience dictate that revenue rulings should be entitled to Chevron 
deference.261 Guiding principles of expertise, agency purpose, administrative 
feasibility, certainty, and consistency support this conclusion. Applying 
Chevron deference to revenue rulings is not foreign to the courts. For 
example, in Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc., a special concurrence 
concluded that IRS revenue procedures are entitled to Chevron deference.262 
Additionally, in Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc., the court stated, “[W]e conclude 
that the underlying rationale of Revenue Ruling 82-20 is valid, ‘reflect[s] 
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the agency’s longstanding interpretation of its own regulations,’ and thus 
deserves ‘substantial judicial deference.’”263 
A. The IRS as the Tax Expert  
Agency expertise provides support for substantial deference to 
revenue rulings.264 Under the IRC, the IRS has been tasked with not only 
revenue collection but also non-revenue raising functions associated with 
home ownership, health care, education, work incentives, and reduction of 
poverty.265 Thus, Congress has recognized that the IRS is a necessary arm 
of the government and is at least somewhat successful in the associated 
field of expertise.266 Stripping IRS revenue rulings of deference is 
irrational because tax law is exceedingly specialized, with a vast body of 
law and guidance; the subject matter specialization of the IRS should be 
more unescapable to reviewing courts than less specialized areas of law.267 
Furthermore, unlike appointed federal judges, Treasury officials are 
democratically accountable, better situated to be receptive of taxpayer 
behavior and changes in policy, and possess significantly more expertise 
in the convoluted area of tax law.268 In 2015, federal district courts across 
the nation were flooded with the filing of more than 300,000 new 
lawsuits.269 Federal judges already are overworked, and litigants are stuck 
waiting years before their particular matters reach judicial resolution.270 It 
is impractical and a waste of judicial resources for a court to interpret law 
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that subject matter experts, the IRS, already have addressed. Revenue 
rulings are generated with a great deal of care and precision,271 and 
substantially deferring to them is practical for the judiciary and complies 
with principles of administrative law as a whole.272 Chevron is intended to 
detach the courts from the substantive act of agency lawmaking if the 
agency stays within legislatively defined parameters,273 and as such, 
revenue rulings deserve substantial judicial deference. 
A counterargument to the call for revenue ruling deference based on 
the expertise of IRS officials compared to federal judges arises where the 
jurisdiction of tax courts begins.274 A query exists as to why—in this 
specialized court for this specific area of the law—the judges are not 
accorded a presumption of both procedural and subject matter expertise. 
Furthermore, scholars who oppose giving Chevron deference to revenue 
rulings take this position because of a disfavor of tax exceptionalism.275 
But carving out an exception for tax law compared to other administrative 
agencies is exactly what the Supreme Court denounced in Mayo 
Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States.276 
Holding that challenges to the validity of Treasury regulations generally 
are governed by Chevron to the same extent as any other promulgation 
issued by another administrative agency, Mayo clarified that tax law is 
integrated into the broad sphere of administrative law.277 As such, the 
existence of the specialized Tax Court has no bearing on the judicial 
standard of deference accorded to any agency act, whether a particular act 
comes before the Tax Court or any other federal court. Furthermore, this 
Comment does not advocate for Chevron deference solely for IRS revenue 
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rulings but supports substantial deference to all agency interpretations that 
meet the requirements of Chevron and Mead.278 
B. The Need for Quick Answers 
The issue of democracy and lack of notice-and-comment procedures 
may cause many taxpayers to question whether Chevron deference is 
appropriate for revenue rulings. Though revenue rulings typically are not 
generated through public notice-and-comment procedures—a process that 
the Supreme Court has explicitly stated is not required for Chevron 
deference279—there remains an opportunity for public participation in the 
process of creating revenue rulings.280 Public “outcry,” or the need for 
guidance in a complex or confusing situation, is why revenue rulings exist 
and how the creation of one is sparked.281 The revenue ruling program 
emerged in 1953 as a solution to controversy over the reluctance of the 
IRS to make letter rulings publically available after issuance to individual 
taxpayers.282 Additionally, the IRS occasionally requests comments from 
the public on proposed revenue rulings.283 Furthermore, Congress is 
notorious for taking lengthy amounts of time to pass legislation,284 and 
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according deference to administrative positions—if and when Congress 
finds those positions to contradict legislative intent—may encourage 
Congress to draft better laws that provide more clarity and certainty.285 
C. Revenue Rulings Actually Save Taxpayer Dollars  
Moreover, administrative feasibility and costs associated with 
promulgating more formal statutes or regulations support increased 
deference to revenue rulings, along with encouraging their creation. It is 
neither feasible nor realistic to expect Congress to legislate, much less 
anticipate, every possible issue and detail that might arise, thus triggering the 
need for additional clarification via statutory guidance.286 The IRS issues 
revenue rulings under various levels of review and authority287 prescribed by 
the Internal Revenue Manual.288 Revenue rulings also are generated in a more 
economical and sensible manner by not engaging in notice-and-comment 
procedures.289 The notice-and-comment process consumes an enormous 
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amount of time and resources, with a single rule often taking five to ten 
years and tens of thousands of agency staff hours to promulgate.290 Time 
and resource commitment associated with notice-and-comment leads to 
such a burdensome process that, were revenue rulings subjected to notice-
and-comment, the IRS routinely would delay or defer the issuance of these 
rulings.291 This potential delay is common in other agencies.292 Notice-
and-comment does not necessarily mean there will be any more public 
participation in generating tax guidance than already exists293 because 
notice-and-comment is used primarily as a recordkeeping process and 
typically occurs when a rule is near its final form.294 As such, revenue 
rulings as they currently exist are more ideal than other alternative sources 
of law, such as Treasury regulations. 
Shifting to a system that relies more heavily on revenue rulings than 
costly and time-consuming regulations is justified by reducing the 
agency’s burdens.295 Conversely, denying revenue rulings substantial 
judicial deference will give taxpayers an indication they need not to abide 
by rulings. When deference is denied to authoritative pronouncements, 
costs and associated litigation rates likely will skyrocket, instances of 
noncompliance will increase, and the IRS will have to divert resources to 
enforcing the established law.296 Although costs of producing guidance 
alone do not correlate directly to the level of deference accorded, a cursory 
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glance over associated costs helps explain why revenue rulings require 
judicial deference.297 Giving revenue rulings Chevron deference signals to 
taxpayers that compliance is mandatory and will act as a gatekeeper to 
would-be tax litigation, and “[t]he tax system cannot run without some 
level of baseline deference to the tax administrator, which has no option 
but to speak through something ‘less’ than regulations issued after notice 
and hearing.”298 The policy issues associated with increased costs, in 
addition to the legally-mandated requirements for deference being met, 
requires Chevron deference for revenue rulings because anything less, 
including Skidmore deference, is really no deference at all.299 
D. Certainty, Reliance, and Consistency: Avoiding Incoherent 
Representations 
Taxpayer certainty and reliance require an efficient and effective 
method of taxation, and “[r]obbing revenue rulings of any claim to actual 
deference will diminish the IRS’s ability to inform taxpayers and IRS 
personnel of the law and ultimately to set IRS policy and ensure voluntary 
compliance with revenue laws.”300 Furthermore, general notions of equity 
indicate that taxpayers expect the IRS to comply with its self-imposed duty 
of consistency, which implicitly provides for taxpayer certainty.301 
Congressional rules are more appropriate for providing certainty in areas 
in which there is little change over time, which is not the case in either tax 
law or in the charitable organization context.302 Though revenue rulings 
necessarily are subject to less scrutiny than regulations and statutes, often 
written in a conclusory style without a detailed explanation of factual 
significance to the outcome, and lack clear reasoning as to why both the 
facts and law support the finding,303 the rough justice they provide is 
outweighed by many other redeeming qualities. For example, the 
Commissioner of the IRS has the authority to retroactively revoke a 
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revenue ruling that is contrary to law, in accordance with the congressional 
intent evidenced in IRC § 7805(b).304 
Like certainty and reliance, consistency is another fundamental 
requirement for an effective tax administration to thrive. The IRS 
continually has affirmed that treating similarly situated taxpayers equally 
is an important goal of the tax system.305 Courts also recognize that 
horizontal equity306 is an important goal of the tax system.307 Although 
Congress has delegated to the Treasury Department—and implicitly to the 
IRS—the authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations”308 for 
enforcement of the IRC, this grant of authority rests in part on the need to 
“ensure that in ‘this area of limitless factual variations,’ . . . like cases will 
be treated alike.”309 Inconsistency contributes to taxpayer distrust in the 
IRS, which may threaten the soundness of self-reporting—a practice the 
IRS relies on heavily.310 A general and rigid policy of deference would 
increase national uniformity regarding the meaning of tax laws by 
decreasing the chance that courts across the nation adopt different views 
when interpreting a particular provision of the IRC.311 Establishing a 
policy of deference also would encourage the IRS to issue as much 
guidance as possible.312 
The need for a grant of Chevron deference to all IRS revenue rulings 
that meet the requisite standard is especially pertinent in the context of 
charitable organizations. Charitable organizations, like every other entity 
regulated by law, need deliberate and principled analysis of the implicated 
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values in tax law.313 Because the resolution of these vast issues has 
significant financial implications, these organizations need a reliable set 
of rules that create a clear and principled approach.314 These financial 
implications also affect organizational behavior; thus, having clear, 
concise, and reliable rules serves a broader social interest as well.315 For 
example, though widely criticized, Revenue Ruling 69-545 still is cited 
and employed316 for providing the standard by which hospitals rely on to 
achieve charitable organization status.317 The question of realizing 
democratic goals also is avoided because Congress affords charitable 
organizations the right to challenge any IRS decision denying the 
organization charitable status.318 A charitable organization also can 
challenge IRS decisions in court by refusing to pay a tax—after which the 
IRS will assess a deficiency against the organization—and then seeking a 
refund from the IRS based on the organization’s tax-exempt status.319 
Utilizing these various mechanism of review, “courts have played a role 
in defining the contours of charitable organizations and healthcare.”320 
CONCLUSION 
Revenue rulings deserve substantial deference because they carry the 
force of law and result from a formal administrative procedure. The IRS 
issues revenue rulings under a general grant of authority by Congress, 
which implicitly shows that Congress intends them to have the force of 
law.321 The intent for revenue rulings to carry the force and effect of law 
is evidenced further by the congressionally-mandated penalties that arise 
when taxpayers do not comply with revenue rulings.322 Courts also should 
afford revenue rulings Chevron deference, as such pronouncements are 
responsive to complicated issues in a relatively quick manner, alleviating 
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the “cumbersome, time consuming, and expensive” problems associated 
with notice-and-comment practices.323 Additionally, denying heightened 
deference to revenue rulings runs afoul of the explicit reason the IRS 
issues these pronouncements: to aid voluntary compliance with revenue 
laws.324 If courts fail to defer substantially to revenue rulings, courts signal 
to the public that reliance may not be justified; if courts do not 
substantially defer to revenue rulings, such lack of deference indicates that 
the IRS cannot necessarily be credited with correct interpretation of the 
body of law over which this agency is required to exercise its enforcement 
power and its right to provide guidance to the public. Furthermore, as seen 
in the promulgation of Revenue Ruling 2007-41, revenue rulings are not 
created arbitrarily but rather in response to public outcry and following 
solicitation for public input.325 
If the most appropriate method for promulgating governing rules is 
not accorded adequate deference by the courts, the whole taxation 
enterprise will collapse. Even though guidance in the form of revenue 
rulings is much needed,326 the IRS would be stripped of any incentive to 
take time and resources away from other pressing issues to focus on 
promulgating documents that courts will toss to the side. Because they are 
the ideal method for shaping tax law both in the charitable organization 
context and tax law as a whole, revenue rulings that inherently carry the 
force and effect of law are entitled to substantial—or Chevron—deference 
by reviewing courts. 
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